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THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESSMAN MEETS THE
ANTI-TRUST LAWS
Sol M. Linowitz*
Recently the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
opened hearings on the effect of our anti-trust laws abroad. In doing so,
it focused attention on one of the most vexing problems confronting
American business and industry today.
During the past several years it has become increasingly obvious that
an ever greater number of American manufacturing companies will be
looking abroad for expansion of their consumer markets. Such a program
on the part of American industry will not only help advance the inter-
relationship between our economy and that of the rest of the world, but
will do so in a manner precisely designed to further the objectives of our
Government. For ever since World War II it has been established
national policy to make the benefit of our scientific advance and industrial
progress available to the other countries of the world. This has necessarily
meant that private American business must be encouraged to seek invest-
ment outside of the United States.
But any company which considers foreign manufacture immediately
finds itself confronted with a myriad of complex problems requiring
thorough analysis and careful appraisal. Such matters as exchange
barriers, tariff restrictions, import licenses and quotas, relationship of a
particular government to a specific industry, taxation problems, patent
working requirements, local favoritism-all play an important part in
reaching a decision as to whether to set up a plant in one country rather
than another. Inevitably, the answer reached will reflect a juggling of
various considerations and the striking of a balance which will make most
sense to the particular company in the light of its own specific situation.
All of this is, of course, reasonably to be expected by the American busi-
nessman as he ventures abroad. What may not be so clear, however, is
that the American manufacturer seeking to go into business in a foreign
country must also keep one eye carefully cocked on the United States
anti-trust laws, which will hover threateningly over his activities even
outside of the United States.
It was not always this way. For a number of years courts construed the
anti-trust laws as only indirectly pertinent to foreign operations, and then
only if action was taken by an American company in the international
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 241, for biographical data.
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field which was glaringly unreasonable or unlawful.' The Sherman Anti-
Trust Act by its terms does, of course, refer specifically to foreign com-
merce. Section 1 of the Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. (Emphasis added.)
2
And section 2 says:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine, or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. (Emphasis added.) 3
In the past, American companies doing business in other countries have
been led to expect that they might operate under the same rules as the for-
eign companies with which they would have to compete.4 The federal dis-
trict court in the United States Steel case summarized the basic reason for
such a view:
To hold otherwise would be, practically and commercially, to enjoin
the . ... trade of the United States from using the best methods which are
necessary in order to build up and maintain a dependable business abroad,
and if the Sherman Law were so construed, it would itself be a restraint of
trade and unduly prejudice the public by restraining foreign trade.5
During the last few years, however, the Supreme Court and other fed-
eral courts have moved far away from this position. 6 And the American
manufacturer who presently seeks to go into business abroad must bear
in mind that an agreement carefully worked out with another company
thousand of miles from the United States may get him into trouble under
the anti-trust laws here at home, if it is ultimately considered to have an
1 Thorns v. Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1931) ; United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 223 Fed. 55 (D.NJ. 1915), aff'd, 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. Keystone
Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502 (EfD. Pa. 1915), appeal dismissed, 257 U.S. 664 (1921).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
3 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
4 In American Banana Co. v. UnitedFruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909), the Court said:
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him accord-
ing to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only
would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign,
contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.
5 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 Fed. 55, 114 (D.N.J. 1915), aff'd, 251
U.S. 417 (1920). Under any circumstance, of course, arrangements between American and
foreign companies designed solely for the purpose of controlling prices in the United States
and to exclude competitors from the American market would be branded illegal. See United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. General Electric Co.,
80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
6 See pages 218-21 infra, and full discussion in Bergson, Antitrust Problems of.




adverse effect on the domestic, export, or import markets of the United
States.
Let's take the usual case of the American manufacturer who decides to
enter into foreign manufacture. He has essentially three choices before
him.
First, he can set up a branch factory in which he does his own manu-
facturing and arranges for his own distribution. Since such a branch
would not be a separate legal entity, this kind of an arrangement ob-
viously does not involve any problem under the anti-trust laws.7
A second possibility is for the American manufacturer to establish a
wholly-owned subsidiary in the foreign country. Again, it is clear that the
thrust of the anti-trust laws is not directed at such a relationship and
this will ordinarily be the position of the Department of Justice and the
courts. (As a case in point, the consent decree which the Justice Depart-
ment signed with the United Engineering and Foundry Company in 1952
by its terms specifically provided that it was not applicable to transactions
solely between the American company and its wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary.')
As a practical matter, however, neither of these first two possibilities
7 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 962 (D. Mass.
1950):
Nor is it any excuse that American export trade might have been equally adversely
affected if there had been-or if there should now be-established plants in Great Britain,
Canada and Germany by one or more of the manufacturing defendants acting inde-
pendently. Such supposititious individual action would, it is true, be a restraint upon
American commerce with foreign nations. But such a restraint would not be the result
of a combination or conspiracy. Hence it would not run afoul of Sec. I of the Sherman
Act. Nox would it, so far as now appears, have the purpose or effect of promoting one
company's monopoly in violation of Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act.
8 United States v. United Engineering and Foundry Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1952-53
Trade Cas.) if 67378, at 67977 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 1952). This does not mean that a wholly-
owned subsidiary entirely escapes the possibility of antitrust involvement but that the dan-
gers are to a very substantial extent minimized. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495
(1948). But cf. Justice Black in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593,
599 (1951):
We also reject the suggestion that the Sherman Act should not be enforced in this case
because what appellant has done is reasonable in view of current foreign trade conditions.
The argument in this regard seems to be that tariffs, quota restrictions and the like are
now such that the export and import of anti-friction bearings can no longer be expected
as a practical matter; that appellant cannot successfully sell its American-made goods
abroad; and that the only way it can profit from business in England, France and other
countries is through the ownership of stock in companies organized and manufacturing
there. This position ignores the fact that the provisions in the Sherman Act against
restraints of foreign trade are based on the assumption, and reflect the policy, that
export and import trade in commodities is both possible and desirable. Those provisions
of the Act are wholly inconsistent with appellant's argument that American business must
be left free to participate in international cartels, that free foreign commerce in goods
must be sacrificed in order to foster export of American dollars for investment in foreign
factories which sell abroad. Acceptance of appellant's view would make the Sherman
Act a dead letter insofar as it prohibits contracts and conspiracies in restraint of foreign
trade. If such a drastic change is to be made in the statute, Congress is the one to do it.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
may be very real. There may be limitations on company finances avail-
able for investment abroad; and there frequently are a number of sound
reasons why significant local participation in a new foreign company is
strongly to be desired.9
A third possibility, therefore, is to form a jointly-owned company in
which the American manufacturer and a foreign company engaged in
business in the country join forces. This may frequently involve the
contribution of patent rights, trade-marks, know-how, and technical data
by the American company, and working capital, raw material, and possibly
administration by the foreign co-adventurer. Each then obtains shares of
stock in the new company and, occasionally, the American contributor
also is entitled to a royalty.'
0
Assuming the American company decides on a jointly-owned enter-
prise, then, how far can it go in limiting the market of the new company?
For example, can the American manufacturer insist that the new company
not sell its products in the United States? By the same token, can the
American company, as part of the agreement, undertake not to sell in
competition with the new company in the latter's home market? In short,
can the American company, the foreign partner, and the new company
explicitly agree that each will undertake to develop the market in certain
designated areas without undue intrusion into the market of the other?
The questions are, unfortunately, a great deal clearer than the answers.
The United States Supreme Court decision in the Timken Roller Bear-
ing Company" case five years ago has become the bite noire for Amer-
ican investors faced with some of these problems. In that case American
Timken had issued certain licenses under its patents to British Timken
and imposed certain restrictive agreements. When the licenses expired,
American Timken bought into British Timken. At the same time, British
and American Timken each held 50% of the stock of French Timken.
The agreements among the three companies undertook to allocate world
territories and to fix prices on products which one might sell in the terri-
tory of the other; provided for cooperation to protect each other's market
and to eliminate outside competition; and involved certain restrictions of
9 For example, the manner in which a particular government may regard and deal with
a company having local management participation is often important, as is local favoritism
toward locally owned or managed industries.
10 A fourth possibility if patents or trade-marks are involved is issuance of licenses to
foreign companies. For the purposes of this discussion, however, such a license arrangement
would be subject to almost identically the same problems as the joint company since it
would similarly involve having two companies agree on working together abroad and, there-
fore, pose the same issues with respect to the effect on competition and on commerce with
the United States.
11 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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imports to, and exports from the United States. Four opinions were writ-
ten by the Supreme Court, each taking a quite different view of the agree-
ments and their standing under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
The majority of the Court held that the agreements violated the
Sherman Act and that the French and British companies-partly owned
by the American-were separate entities which could and did conspire
with American Timken in the violations. The opinion written by Justice
Black, in which he was joined by Justices Douglas and Minton, squarely
found that the combination was "not for lawful business enterprise" but
"to eliminate competition"; that if it were not for these "rigid contractual
restrictions," American Timken would have done considerable foreign
business; and that American Timken should be divested of its holdings
in the French and British companies. Justices Reed and Vinson concurred
in the Black opinion in finding that there were violations of the anti-trust
laws, but did not agree that there should be divestiture of the foreign
holdings. Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion in which he con-
tended that the anti-trust laws had not been violated. "The circumstances
of foreign trade," he said, "may alter the incidence of what in the setting
of domestic commerce would be a clear case of unreasonable restraint of
trade."'2 And the fourth opinion, by Justice Jackson, stated that the
conspiracy doctrine just had no application to a joint venture such as the
one involved in the Timken case and that it should be possible for an
American corporation to organize such subsidiaries and joint ventures in
order to go after foreign markets in a realistic manner.
The innuendoes and implications of the Timken decision were greeted
with dismay by legal, economic, and political analysts, who agreed with
Justice Jackson's comment that "this decision will restrain more trade
than it will make free."'13 With the passage of time, however, and in the
light of fuller analysis, it seems clear that such appraisals of the effect of
the decision were hardly justified.
In the first place, careful study of the record of the case clearly shows
that the Timken situation presented an aggregate of out-and-out restric-
tions, including price fixing, which were illegal per se. Secondly, the
primary purpose of the arrangement was manifestly one of restraint
rather than (as the defendants argued) the ancillary objective of exploit-
12 Id. at 605.
13 Id. at 608. See Government Regulation of Business--Antitrust, The Supreme Court,
1950 Term, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 107, 114 (1951); "Increasing International Trade Through
Product Licenses," International Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Council (1953); cf. Oppen-
helm, "Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Act," 42 Trade-Mark Rep. 3 (1951); Note,
"The Sherman Act and Multi-Corporate Single Traders: Competition Among Affiliates," 100
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1006 (1952).
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ing trade-mark rights. Finally-and most importantly-all the opinions
made clear that a jointly-owned company arrangement is not in and of
itself illegal, but each case must be weighed in the light of its own partic-
ular circumstances including the purpose for which it is organized, the
nature of the restrictions imposed and controls exercised, and the effect
on the entire competitive relationship, both domestic and foreign.
Other cases dealing with similar problems support such a view. Four
years before the Timken case the Supreme Court had decided the Na-
tional Lead 4 case and held that National Lead, Titan, Inc. (a subsidiary
of National Lead Company once controlled by Norwegian interests), and
duPont were all involved in an unlawful restraint of trade. National Lead
and duPont, controlling 100% of the domestic titanium pigment industry,
had joined together in an arrangement whereby National Lead was to
have exclusive rights in North America and the Norwegian participants
in the rest of the world; patents were not to be challenged; patent appli-
cations were to be exchanged; and prices were to be fixed. Imports of
finished materials were approved provided they did not interfere sub-
stantially with local sales. The Court found that by this arrangement
patents had "been forged into instruments of domination of an entire
industry," and, therefore, held the agreement to be illegal.
In the Minnesota Mining'5 case, decided in 1950, Judge Wyzanski of
the District Court of Massachusetts held illegal a combination of Amer-
ican manufacturers controlling four-fifths of the export trade in coated
abrasives in order to organize jointly-owned factories abroad and to
refrain from exporting where the foreign-made products could be sold
more profitably. He decreed the dissolution of the joint foreign manufac-
turing and sales corporations.
In the General Electric Lamp'" case, General Electric, with 92 % of the
domestic incandescent lamp industry under its control, was held to have
illegally entered into certain agreements providing for exchange of patent
rights, manufacturing information, and allocation of foreign territories.
Significantly, the court rejected the argument that these agreements were
merely incidental to the sale and exchange of know-how abroad since it
appeared to the court that the actual information, patents, know-how,
etc. involved were insufficient in value to justify such restraints.'
7
14 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 Us.
319 (1947).
15 United States v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass.
1950).
16 United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1949).
17 Id. at 845.
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The complicated ICI'8 case, decided in 1951 and 1952 by the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, found ICI, duPont, and
Remington Arms guilty of violating the anti-trust laws because patent
license arrangements were intertwined with international territorial allot-
ments in an illegal fashion which restrained commerce. The court there
ordered compulsory licensing of certain patents, restraint on the right of
exclusion of certain imports, and divestiture of a number of jointly-owned
companies. Again, however, it emphasized that in its judgment the de-
fendants had sought to overcome legal and economic obstacles to trade
abroad not by legal methods but by a comprehensive plan with a multi-
tude of restraints designed to curtail competition.
All of these cases held the anti-trust laws to have been violated, yet in
each the court found an absence of a bona fide effort to promote foreign
trade; for in every instance companies dominant in an industry agreed
among themselves to try to divide up world markets against competition.
Neither in the Timken case nor in any other case has a court said that
American and foreign companies may not join together for a valid pur-
pose of expansion of trade, including as part of such agreement restric-
tions and understandings reasonably and realistically related to the
protection of legitimate property, patent, and trade-mark rights and
consistent with the maintenance or encouragement of competition. In
short, there is still every reason to believe that if and when faced with the
precise issue, courts would hold that the same "rule of reason" applied
in other anti-trust situations should also apply here.19 Under this rule a
court after analyzing the facts, the objectives, and the probable effects,
would determine whether, all things considered, the arrangement was
reasonable and in the public interest, rather than a conspiratorial effort
to achieve an improper restraint of trade.
As early as 1931, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had, as a matter
of fact, applied this "rule of reason" to such an arrangement in Thorns
18 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.DN.Y. 1951),
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
19 The doctrine as announced by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), would authorize the court to examine relevant economic
data in order to determine the reasonableness of the relationship under scrutiny and its
effects. As the Court said in the Standard Oil case, supra at 68:
Unaided by the light of reason it is impossible to understand how the statute may in the
future be enforced and the public policy which it establishes be made efficacious.
While judicial application of the rule of reason in domestic matters has covered a wide arc,
today the Supreme Court does not tend to regard competition as "an absolute," and will
invoke the rule of reason in determining whether the statute has been violated. See FCC v.
RCA Communications Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953). See also Bergson, op. cit. supra note 6.
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v. Sutherland,2° and the recent Beneflux2 ' case followed the same doctrine.
Moreover, as time goes on, we can probably expect that foreign govern-
ments, which have begun to resent the application of the United States
anti-trust laws to activities under their jurisdiction, will react as did the
British Court of Appeal a short time ago. In the British Nylon Spinners22
case, the British court held that it was not required by rules of comity
to give effect in Great Britain to the United States federal court decision
in the ICI case.
How does all this add up for the American manufacturer who wants to
do the right kind of a job abroad by means of a jointly-owned company?
The first rule is to exercise considerable care and caution in the selection
of the foreign partner. If the co-owner in the joint enterprise is a com-
petitor, it is especially important that his contribution be substantial,
realistic, and continuing. Any arrangement with a competitor is, it must
be remembered, certain to be carefully scrutinized. If the partner is not
a competitor, his participation must be justifiable on sound legal, eco-
nomic, or political grounds and involve a sensible quid pro quo.
Secondly, any agreement which is made between the American and the
new company should avoid reference to those things which are already
established under existing laws. For example, patent laws may grant a
right to exclude certain exports by the new company into the United
States, but that does not mean that a provision to that effect should also
be included in an agreement. Reliance, in short, must be placed on the
20 Thorns v. Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1931), where the court held that a restric-
tive covenant against competition by the vendor was proper as incidental to the sale of a
secret process.
21 Foundry Services, Inc. v. Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd
on other grounds, 206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953). The plaintiff, a subsidiary of an English
corporation, owned certain secret processes and had an exclusive license to manufacture and
sell in the United States and Canada upon the understanding that the English corporation
would not sell there and that the plaintiff would not export without the English company's
approval. In granting the plaintiff an injunction against the cancellation of its agreement,
the district court held the agreement reasonable and lawful, since the parties were not com-
petitors and ". . . common sense and justice as well as the 'normal' and 'usual' business
custom of rational men dictate that a principal refrain from undertaking to perform at the
same time and in the same place the precise functions it has engaged a representative to
perform." 110 F. Supp. at 861.
22 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R.
780, [19531 1 Ch. 19, aff'd, [1954] 3 All E.R. 88. In United States v. Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd., supra note 18, the court ordered a British corporation to assign back certain
British patents to duPont and to receive no licenses under these British patents unless there
was involved a right of United States manufacturers to export and sell the patented product
in the United Kingdom. The British Court of Appeal held that the United States judgment
could not undertake to affect British nationals in a judgment directed against a British
national and involving different property rights created under British law.
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patent laws rather than on the language of the contract for enforcing such
exclusion.
Finally, any restraint imposed should be genuinely designed to protect
legitimate property, patent, trade-mark, or similar rights in international
trade. Even geographical limitations could conceivably be justified on
such a ground. An American company might, in a proper case, have good
reason to seek assurance that a new jointly-owned company will properly
exploit a new market and may, therefore, want to ask that the new com-
pany devote itself to that area rather than try to intrude into another
market. Or the American manufacturer may have agreed to the joint
venture on the basic assumption that the patent rights, data, and know-
how which it contributes would be based on the value of getting a new
market in an indicated geographical area rather than in having the new
company export to the United States and other areas in competition with
the American company. Such considerations will strike a businessman as
reasonable and persuasive and, in a proper case and in due course, may
so impress a court.
The report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Anti-Trust Laws, 3 released a few months ago, reflects some of the uncer-
tainty in this whole area but also offers some hope. While the Committee
rejects "any proposal for blanket exemption of foreign commerce from
the anti-trust laws,"24 it also takes the position that the extra-territorial
jurisdiction of the Sherman Act "applies only to those arrangements be-
tween Americans alone or in concert with foreign firms, which have such
substantial and competitive effects on this country's trade or commerce
. with foreign nations as to constitute unreasonable restraints. 2 5
At the present time, however, the American businessman moving into
the foreign field must continue to proceed with caution and crossed fingers.
For the best counsel in the whole realm of anti-trust law, domestic and
foreign alike, is still that once given to a client by Louis Brandeis: "I can
tell you where the edge of the cliff is but not whether the wind will be
blowing, or from which direction, as you pass by."
23 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-Trust Laws
65-114 (1955).
24 Id. at 66.
25 Id. at 76.
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